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Abstract. This position paper describes work on trust assumptions in the con-
text of security requirements. We show how trust assumptions can affect the 
scope of the analysis, derivation of security requirements, and in some cases 
how functionality is realized. An example shows how trust assumptions are 
used by a requirements engineer to help define and limit the scope of analysis 
and to document the decisions made during the process. 
1 Introduction 
Requirements engineering is about determining the characteristics of a system-to-be, 
and how well these characteristics fit with the desires of the stakeholders. A system-
to-be includes all the diverse components needed to achieve its purpose, such as the 
computers, the people who will use, maintain, and depend on the system and the 
environment the system exists within. Stakeholders are those entities (e.g. people, 
companies) that have some reason to care about the system’s characteristics. A de-
scription of these characteristics is the system’s requirements. 
Security requirements are an important component of a system’s requirements. 
They arise because stakeholders assert that some objects, tangible (e.g. cash) or in-
tangible (e.g. information), have direct or indirect value. Such objects are called as-
sets, and the stakeholders naturally wish to protect their value. Assets can be harmed, 
or can be used to cause indirect harm, such as to reputation. Security requirements 
ensure that these undesirable outcomes cannot take place. 
Security requirements often assume the existence of an attacker. The goal of an at-
tacker is to cause harm. Leaving aside harm caused by accident, if one can show that 
no attackers exist, then security is irrelevant. An attacker wishes to cause harm by 
exploiting an asset in some undesirable way. The possibility of such an exploitation is 
called a threat. An attack exploits a vulnerability in the system to carry out a threat.  
It is useful to reason about the attacker as if he or she were a type of stakeholder 
(e.g. [1; 9; 10]). The attacker would therefore have requirements; he or she wants a 
system to have characteristics that create vulnerabilities. The requirements engineer 
wants the attacker’s requirements to not be met. To accomplish this, one specifies 
sufficient constraints on the behavior of a system to ensure that vulnerabilities are 
kept to an acceptable minimum [11]. Security requirements specify these constraints.  
A system-level analysis is required to obtain security requirements. Without 
knowledge of a system’s components, the requirements engineer is limited to general 
statements about a system’s security needs. Nothing can be said about how the needs 
are met. To determine security requirements, one must look deeper; we propose to 
use problem frames [8] to accomplish this. In a problem frames analysis, this means 
looking at and describing the behavior of domains within the context of the system. 
While reasoning about security, a requirements engineer must make decisions 
about how much to trust the supplied indicative (observable) properties of domains 
that make up the system and evaluate the risks associated with being wrong. These 
decisions are trust assumptions, and they can have a fundamental impact on how the 
system is realized [13]. Trust assumptions can affect which domains must be ana-
lyzed, the risk that vulnerabilities exist, and the risk that a system design is stable. 
During analysis, trust assumptions permit the requirements engineer to pick battles, 
deciding which domains need further analysis and which do not. 
This paper describes combining trust assumptions, problem frames, and threat de-
scriptions in order to aid in derivation of security requirements. Section 2 provides 
background material on problem frames. Section 3 discusses security requirements. 
Section 4 describes the role of trust assumptions. Section 5 presents related work, and 
section 6 concludes. 
2 Problem Frames 
All problems involve the interaction of domains that exist in the world. The prob-
lem frames notation [8] is useful for diagramming the domains involved in a problem 
and the interconnections (phenomena) between them, and for analyzing their behav-
ior. For example, assume that working with stakeholders produces a requirement 
“open door when the door-open button is pushed.” Figure 1 illustrates satisfying the 
requirement with a basic automatic door system. The first domain is the door mecha-
nism domain, capable of opening and shutting the door. The second is the domain 
requesting that the door be opened; including both the ‘button’ to be pushed and the 
human pushing the button. The third is the machine, the domain being designed to 
fulfill the requirement that the door open when the button is pushed. The dashed-line 
oval presents the requirement that the problem is to satisfy. The dashed arrow from 
the oval indicates which domain is to be constrained by the requirement. 
Every domain has inter-
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Figure 1 – A basic problem frames diagram 
phenomena of designed domains 
(domains to be built as part of 
the solution) are optative; one 
wishes to observe the phenom-
ena in the future. To illustrate the 
idea of phenomena, consider the 
person+button domain in Figure 
1. The domain might produce the 
event phenomena ButtonDown 
and ButtonUp when the button is 
respectively pushed and released. 
Alternatively, it might produce the single event OpenDoor, combining the two events 
into one.  
The two fundamental diagram types in a problem frames analysis are the context 
diagram and the problem frame diagrams. The context diagram shows all the do-
mains in a system, and how they are interconnected. The problem frame diagrams 
each examine a problem in the system, showing how a given requirement (problem) 
is to be satisfied. In systems with only one requirement, the context diagram and the 
problem frame diagram are almost identical. For most systems, though, the domains 
in the problem frame diagrams are a projection of the context, showing only the do-
mains or groups of domains of interest to the particular problem. 
Figure 2 shows a context diagram for a system that will be used as an example 
throughout the remainder of this paper. The system is a subset of a Human Resources 
system. There are two functional requirements, of which we will consider the second. 
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Figure 2 – Example Context Diagram 
− Salary, personal, and benefits information shall be able to be entered, changed, 
and deleted by HR staff. This information is referred to as payroll information. 
− Users shall have access to kiosks located at convenient locations throughout the 
building and able to display an ‘address list’ subset of personal information con-
sisting of any employee’s name, office, and work telephone number. 
The problem diagram for the second requirement (the ‘address list’ function) is 
shown in Figure 3. Phenomena are intentionally omitted. The security requirements 
will be added in the next section. 
3 Security Requirements 
Security requirements come into existence to prevent harm by attacks on assets [5; 
11]. An asset is something in the context of the system, tangible or not, that is to be 
protected [7]. A threat is the 
potential for abuse of an asset 
that will cause harm in the 
context of the problem. A 
vulnerability is a weakness in 
the system that an attack 
exploits. Security require-
ments are constraints on 
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intended to reduce the scope of vulnerabilities.  
The security community provides general categories for constraints, labeling them 
using the acronym CIA, and more recently more ‘A’s [12]: 
− Confidentiality: ensure that an asset is visible only to those actors authorized to 
see it. This is larger than ‘read access to a file’, as it can include, for example, 
visibility of a data stream on a network. 
− Integrity: ensure that the asset is not corrupted. As above, integrity is larger than 
‘write access to a file’, including operations such as triggering transactions that 
should not occur. 
− Availability: ensure that the asset is readily accessible to actors that need it. Avail-
ability is best explained by a counterexample, such as preventing a company from 
doing business by denying it access to something important. 
− Authentication & accountability: ensure that the source of the asset, actor, or ac-
tion is known. One example is the simple login. More complex examples include 
mutual authentication (e.g. exchanging cryptography keys) and non-repudiation. 
By inverting the sense of these categories, one can construct descriptions of possi-
ble threats on assets. These threat descriptions are phrases of the form performing 
action X on/to asset Y could cause harm Z [5]. Referring to the example presented 
above, some possible threat descriptions are: 
− Changing salary data could increase salary costs, lowering earnings. 
− Exposing addresses (to headhunters) could cause loss of employees, raising costs. 
To use the threat descriptions, the requirements engineer examines each problem 
frame diagram, looking to see if the asset mentioned in the threat is found in the prob-
lem. If the asset is found, then the requirements engineer must apply constraints on 
the problem to ensure that the asset is not vulnerable to being used in the way that the 
action in the threat description requires. These constraints are security requirements. 
The security requirements are satisfied by changing the problem in a way that 
changes the behavior of the domains. 
Analysis of Figure 3 shows that there are vulnerabilities that allow the threats to be 
realized. Attackers can see the data on the network. Nothing prevents an attacker 
from accessing the system. In order to maintain confidentiality and integrity of the 
data, the network needs to be protected and employees need to be authenticated. A 
design decision is made to encrypt data on the network, and appropriate constraints 
and phenomena are added. Our next problem is employee authentication; we will 
solve this problem in the next section. 
4 Trust Assumptions 
A requirements engineer determines how a requirement is satisfied using the charac-
teristics of the domains in the problem. A similar relationship exists between security 
requirements and trust assumptions; how security requirements are satisfied depends 
on the trust assumptions made by the requirements engineer. 
We use the definition of trust proposed by Grandison & Sloman [4]: “[Trust] is the 
quantified belief by a trustor with respect to the competence, honesty, security and 
dependability of a trustee within a specified context”. In our case, the requirements 
engineer trusts that some domain will participate ‘competently and honestly’ in the 
satisfaction of a security requirement in the context of the problem. 
Adding trust assumptions serves two purposes. The first is to limit the scope of the 
analysis to the domains in the context. The second is to document how the require-
ments engineer chooses to trust other domains that are in the context for some other 
reason. To illustrate the former, assume a requirement stipulating that the computers 
operate for up to eight hours in the event of a power failure. The requirements engi-
neer satisfies this requirement by adding backup generators to the system. In most 
cases, the engineer can trust the manufacturer of the generators to supply equipment 
without vulnerabilities that permit an attacker to take control of the generators. By 
making this trust assumption, the requirements engineer does not need to include the 
supply chain of the generators in the analysis. 
Returning to our example, we see that trust assumptions must be added to the dia-
gram to complete the picture. For example, the analysis does not explain why the 
encrypted networks and authentication are considered secure or how address informa-
tion is to be protected. The IT organization convinces the requirements engineer that 
the encryption software and keys built into the system are secure, and that the keys 
control access to the address information. Choosing to accept the explanations, the 
engineer adds three trust assumptions (TA1 – TA3) to the problem frame diagram.  
There are threats against the name and address information which indicate that 
confidentiality of the information must be maintained. To counter the threats, the 
requirements engineer proposes that the information be limited to people having au-
thentication information and able to log in. The IT department refuses on cost 
grounds. The stakeholders refuse because of ease-of-use. 
Further questioning reveals that the front door of the building is protected by a se-
curity guard; the guard restricts entrance to authorized personnel. The security man-
ager agrees that the security guard can stand in for authentication. A trust assumption 
(TA4) is added, having the effect of changing the people domain to employees by 
restricting membership to people allowed in by the building security system. Figure 4 
shows the resulting problem frames diagram.  
The example shows that trust assumptions restrict domain membership. For exam-
ple, the building security system trust assumption restricts membership of the people 
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domain to people acceptable to the door guard, effectively converting the domain to 
employees. 
The IT Admin: keys restrict access trust assumption is a special case. The domain 
being limited is an ‘others’ domain representing people not permitted to see the data. 
This domain isn’t in the context. Adding the domain and connecting the trust assump-
tion would restrict the domain’s membership to null. Rather than adding a null do-
main, the trust assumption is expressed in terms of its effect and attached to the do-
main that caused the trust assumption to come into existence. 
5 Related Work 
We are not aware of other work investigating the capture of a requirements engi-
neer’s trust assumptions about the domains that make up the solution to the problem.  
Several groups are looking at the role of trust in security requirements engineering. 
In the i* framework [14; 16], Yu, Lin, & Mylopoulos take an ‘actor, intention, goal’ 
approach where security and trust relationships within the model are modeled as 
“softgoals”: goals that have no quantitative measure for satisfaction. The Tropos 
project [3] uses the i* framework, adding wider lifecycle coverage. Gans et al [2] add 
distrust and “speech acts”. Yu and Cysneiros have added privacy to the mix [15]. All 
of these models are concerned with analyzing trust relations between actors/agents in 
the running system. As such, an i* model complements the approach presented here, 
and in fact can be used to determine the goals and requirements. 
He and Antón [6] are concentrating on privacy, working on mechanisms to assist 
trusting of privacy policies, for example on web sites. They propose a context-based 
access model. The framework, like i*, describes run-time properties, not the require-
ments engineer’s assumptions about the domains forming the solution. 
6 Conclusions and Future Work 
We have described an approach for using trust assumptions while reasoning about 
security requirements. The approach makes a strong distinction between system re-
quirements and machine specifications, permitting the requirements engineer to 
choose how to conform to the requirements. The trust assumptions embedded in the 
domain inform the requirements engineer, better enabling him or her to choose be-
tween alternate ways of satisfying the functional requirements while ensuring that 
vulnerabilities are removed or not created. 
Work on trust assumptions is part of a larger context wherein security require-
ments are determined using the crosscutting properties of threat descriptions [5]. The 
trust assumptions will play a critical role in analyzing cost and risk. The quantifica-
tion of the level of trust, not yet used, will be important in this context. 
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